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Elite Formation in Late Nineteenth Century: 
France Compared to Britain and Germany 
Christophe Charle ∗ 
Abstract: In a famous and controversial book, Arno J. Mayer has defined Eu-
ropean society at the end of 19th century as a persistent Ancien Regime1. To 
defend his thesis, he invoked in particular the recruitment and formation of 
dominant elites mainly in Britain, Germany, the Dual Monarchy, Russia and 
more sketchily in Italy, Spain and even France. As I have shown in two of my 
books (Les élites de la République and La crise des sociétés impériales2), this 
thesis already controversial in the first quoted countries is not at all relevant for 
France. This does not mean that France was, as pretended its republican gov-
erning elites, a democratic and meritocratic nation, but that it is impossible to 
analyse elites in France with so broad and unprecise concepts as aristocracy, 
bourgeoisie and so on. The aim of this paper is to propose a new perspective 
with new social concepts and to compare them with results of the study of el-
ites in the two other imperial societies, UK and Germany. We shall begin with 
France and then turn to these countries to show some similarities and differ-
ences forgotten by current historiography. 
Old and New elites in France 
Compared to British and German middle classes, the position of the French 
middle class may be seen both as strong and difficult. Strong, since the aristo-
cratic and notable families have lost parliamentary power in 1879 and that the 
hypothesis of a monarchist restauration seems rather unrealistic at the begin-
ning of the XXth century with the failure of the antidreyfusard and nationalist 
campaign. Even the monarchist and bonapartist parties are obliged to use a 
democratic discourse to justify their critics of the Republic. Old elites keep 
some power and presence in traditional and rural regions such as Brittany or 
Franche-Comté and south of the Massif Central, or in some elitist corps, such 
as the diplomacy, upper grades of the army or the Cour des Comptes, but even 
there the bourgeois and meritocratic elements are dominant. What is called in 
Paris, “le monde” or the “high life”, dominated by rich aristocratic families, is a 
social model still alive for nostalgic bourgeois or “nouveaux riches” who imi-
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tate their way of life (castles, rich mansions in the West End in Paris, clubs and 
sports borrowed from the British aristocratic way of life)3. But its power is only 
a symbolic one and relegated to the cultural patronage (charity, artistic and 
concert life, and so on4). 
The late American historian Fritz K. Ringer defined the French bourgeoisie 
a “thrice blessed bourgeoisie”5, in particular when compared to the German 
middle class. Thrice blessed, because she gathers three types of power: political 
power, social power and economic power. In Britain, the middle class must 
share the two first forms of power with the aristocracy and the gentry and is 
obliged to concede new advantages to the growing counter-power of trade 
unions. In Germany, the middle classes are divided between a cultural fraction 
(Bildungsbürgertum) and an economic one, a Southern catholic bourgeoisie 
and a Northern protestant one, big business in heavy industries, middle range 
businessmen in new sectors, and son on. Its political power is limited to great 
towns and urban regions and very weak in the government or in strategic ad-
ministrations like the Army or the diplomacy, still dominated by aristocratic 
elements6. 
In spite of the universal suffrage and a parliamentary regime, French bour-
geois elites succeeded to preserve their economic privileges: their financial 
capital and professional income are less taxed than in Britain and Germany 
since there is no income tax. Land, houses and popular consumption are more 
taxed than the revenues caracteristic of new and bourgeois elites. Therefore 
income inequalities and inherited inequalities are very high in spite of the offi-
cial egalitarian ideology of the Republic. This is not very surprising in a liberal 
and capitalist society. What is more akward is the absence of any real will to 
reform them in spite of left oriented governments in the years 1899-1908 (the 
income tax is only voted in July 1914 and the democratization of elite paths of 
recruitment is very problematic even after the reform of the baccalauréat in 
1902). 
The University and school reforms have been launched at the beginning of 
the 1880s. New universities with stronger faculties of letters and sciences were 
supposed to develop French science which has declined since the Second Em-
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pire. These new paths of social mobility were supposed to give new opportuni-
ties for meritocratic elements compared to the Law faculties or the “grandes 
écoles” recruited in more bourgeois backgrounds. And it is true, as I have 
shown in Les élites de la République, that lower middle class elements are 
present both as students or professors in these faculties. But this does not 
weaken really the dominant access to elites through administrative concours 
and legal training. 
The republican governing elite is in fact divided between a fraction who still 
believes in the virtue of an open elite through a meritocratic selection and a 
more conservative one who prefers to keep a control on access through social 
and economic networks and refuses social reform (rejection of income tax), 
educational reform of the lycée (still expensive with few scholarships) and 
defends the privileges of the Law faculties and the concours for an access to 
dominant administrative positions7. 
This absence of radical reforms for elite formation is not only the result of 
the internal opposition between the two fractions of the governing elites. In a 
society still dominated by rural regions and small enterprises, the two main 
decisions taken by Republican elites are: 
1) building a national school network open to everybody with new possibili-
ties of social promotion through the école primaire supérieure and the 
école normale primaire 
2) option for protectionism and colonial empire to maintain the prosperity of 
rural sectors and small enterprises confronted to the great depression and 
concurrence of new dynamic economies those of Germany and the 
United States.  
They answered to the demands of the social and political majority of the 
country. In a liberal and dynamic prospect, these two options have been criti-
cized later by apostles of a modernized France who saw there the origins of the 
French malthusianism and economic decline leading to the crisis of the Thirties 
and the collapse of 1940. But in the years when these major orientations were 
put into practice, they corresponded exactly to the democratic will of the elec-
torate even if they have been decided by bourgeois elites who should have been 
more prone to the English liberal vision of economy and society. Here lay the 
strength and the weakness of the French parliamentary Republic: it allows the 
presence of bourgeois and petit bourgeois interests to be present or represented 
directly or indirectly through many places of power or public discussion: Par-
liament itself, official or semi-official commissions, advising boards, Trade 
councils, various lobbies linked to MPs. Its failure is the enormous waste of 
energy and time, because of its instability (linked to the absence of well struc-
tured parties like in Germany and the UK) and the multiple interests to be rec-
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onciled before any reform or decision. The solution to this problem was found 
in the preeminence of a particular fraction in the Parliament, the legal bour-
geoisie. This cluster depends for her political future on the fidelity of the local 
voters who oblige it to represent their often contradictory interests. But, at the 
same time, its cultural capital (legal training) gives her a superiority on other 
traditional interests to achieve the best compromise. 
The legal bourgeoisie (bourgeoisie de robe), arbiter of the 
Republic 
This legal bourgeoisie (in French: bourgeoisie de robe)8 is composed of law-
yers (barristers, notaries, magistrates, and so on) and upper-level civil servants, 
all educated in a Law faculty and overrepresented in the Parliament and the 
higher strata of the state apparatus. Both present in Paris and the provinces, it 
forms a link between the other clusters of the bourgeoisie (through its profes-
sional activities, social origins and matrimonial links). Far more than the other, 
more isolated clusters of the middle classes, it gathers professional competence, 
comfortable incomes, and leisure to invest in public activities: businessmen and 
those with landed interest are uneasy in the new democratic atmosphere of the 
republican Parliament and lack the time to invest in professional politics. When 
votes were won through social prestige or administrative pressures, it was 
easier for them to be elected in rural constituencies. With the new liberal sys-
tem, they lose more and more this inherited advantage and in industrial districts 
worker candidates contest even the privilege of bourgeois candidates to occupy 
parliamentary seats as soon as 1893. 
We find deputies or senators coming from this social bracket mainly in the 
republican parties but they are also present too on the right and even on the far 
left. Influenced by the legal culture, they defend political liberalism inherited 
from the French Revolution against any excess of State power. They are at-
tached to individualism as well, free initiative and enterprise, necessary to their 
professional status, and so may share the liberal vision of business elites. But 
there is also a segment of this legal bourgeoisie, influenced by a long tradition 
of a strong State, linked to the centralized monarchy and committed to the 
defense of public interest against corporatism and localism or Church power 
and even the help to the weak people against the powerful9. This later group is 
more present in the “grands corps” who tries to resist to the clientelism and the 
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corruption so frequent in the Parliament at that period. The liberal orientation is 
dominant among this bourgeoisie, but the Dreyfus affair has shown a growing 
rightist orientation of lawyers too (both among students and barristers) linked 
to the hostility to dreyfusard “intellectuals” asking for a meritocratic reform of 
higher education which would weaken the control of these professions on their 
own reproduction10. 
To show the importance of this fraction, we may compare statistics of the 
composition of Parliaments in France and Germany (see table 1). Whereas 
47,9% of deputies in France are members of the professions, it is only the case 
of less than 10% of members of the Reichstag. On the contrary, the presence of 
members of the administration is almost the double in the German Reichstag as 
compared to the French Chamber of Deputies. 
Table 1: Professional recruitment of the Chambre des députés in France in 
1889 and the Reichstag in 1887 
Profession France 1889 Reichstag 1887 
Higher civil servants 
and army officers 
17,2 31,0 
Professions 47,9 9,8 
Landowners 8,2 31,0 
Business 14,8 14,5 
Farmers 6,2 with landowners 
Clergy ? 4,4 
Misc. 2,5 5,4 
Lower middle class 
and popular classes  
3,2 4,9 
 
Sources: H. Best, “Politische Modernisierung und parlamentarische Führungsgrup-
pen in Deutschland 1867-1918”, Historical Social Research, vol. 13, 1988, 1, p. 5-
74; M. Dogan, “Les filières de la carrière politique”, Revue française de sociologie, 
VIII, 4, 1967, p. 472. 
 
In both countries, parliamentary representation is still limited to the middle 
and the upper classes (less than 5% of deputies have popular or lower middle 
class background) but the economic bourgeoisie or the landowners are equally 
underrepresented, compared to their importance in the social structure. 
Whereas in France their interests are defended by members of the professions 
(mainly lawyers), in Germany it is the administration or the landed interest, 
which, like in France during the July monarchy or the Second Empire, is domi-
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nant in the political sphere. It is even far more present than these statistics 
suggest, since the governing elite is composed of higher civil servants or peo-
ple linked to the aristocratic elites. Does this mean, as claimed by Arno Mayer, 
that France is ruled by a liberal and bourgeois elite while Germany is still ruled 
as under the Old Regime? This would be an oversimplification as we will see 
now when examining the German elites in more details. 
German Wilhelminian elites 
The lasting debate about the German Sonderweg has been obsessed by the 
question of the respective importance of the aristocracy and the middle class in 
the ruling elites of Wilhelminian Germany. If we stay at the upper level of 
elites, as in the preceding table, it is true that old traditions seem to stay alive in 
Germany up to the First World War. Though the growing influence of Social-
democracy allows a better representation of the lower classes at the Reichstag, 
the ruling elite and the higher levels of administration remain unchanged. For 
some authors that would mean that the German bourgeoisie failed to get the 
same influence as the French or British middle class in the public sphere and 
even that it accepted the same values as the aristocracy: authority, State control, 
defense of rural interests against modern and liberal society based on urban 
groups and new industrial sectors. The main explanation for this shyness would 
be both the nationalist mood accepting the army as a State in the State and 
under the control of the aristocracy and the social panic in front of the growing 
influence of trade unions and the social-democratic party perceived as a major 
threat against middle class interests. 
Nevertheless more precise studies show some signs of change in the same 
direction as in France. The main way of access to elites are the universities 
which have known a marked increase of their alumini. Students are in majority 
originating from the middle class and the aristocracy (70 to 80%). As well as in 
France, families linked to the professions or civil service are overrepresented 
(38 to 42% depending on the faculties). The economic bourgeoisie is less inter-
ested for her sons by classical universities and more present in the Technische 
Hochschulen (these institutions know a dramatic growth by a factor five be-
tween 1870 and 1914: 11 451 students at this date) or Handelshochschulen – a 
development reminiscent of the strong presence of sons of industrialists or 
businessmen in the engineering or commercial schools in France at the same 
period. A marked difference with France is the aristocratic presence at the Law 
faculties for those who intend to become higher civil servants whereas their 
brothers are formed in elitist regiments to enter later in the cavalry or the gen-
eral staff. Even if subtle differences keep alive the difference of origins be-
tween university students (fraternities of different obedience, service as reserve 
officer in specific regiments), the main road to enter the administration is a 
common legal training followed by State exams and long probatory employ-
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ment without salary as “Referendar” in different administrative posts. These 
rules are applied to both bourgeois and noble students having obtained their 
diplomas in Law11. Religious origins, wealth of the family, proximity to the 
State have still a great importance in the final selection of those obtaining per-
manent posts, but Marie-Bénédicte Vincent has shown that the growing compe-
tition between alumni put an end to the classical nepotism or aristocratic bias in 
the recruitment of higher civil servants. The proportion of higher civil servants 
of bourgeois origin is growing and now largely dominant and there is a kind of 
division of labour between meritocratic and technical functions, more bour-
geois, and representation and territorial posts more aristocratic12. In that period, 
academic titles become in Germany close to equivalent to aristocratic titles for 
the entry in higher circles. The larger recruitment and decentralization of higher 
learning give also better opportunities for access to them than the very few and 
centralized universities existing in France and England13.  
As a consequence, the main weakness of wilhelminian administrative elites 
is not the absence of meritocratic selection but its absence of control by a real 
political power. Higher civil servants may follow their career in preserved 
settings frequenting only their superiors or inferiors recruited on the same basis 
and having an apolitical conception of the State. Ministers themselves are 
mainly stemming from their ranks. They have connections with other economic 
or rural elites through their family ties but the absence of a true parliamentary 
control accustoms them to a technical view of their role. In normal period, with 
the growing influence of the State between 1870 and 1914, it is not an obstacle 
to progress since civil society through associations and the press or debates in 
the parliament may exercize an indirect control hindering major excesses or 
misuse of authority. But during a crisis like the First World War, when the civil 
administration will be subordinated to the military administration, this culture 
of obedience will lead to major errors translated by the dramatic degradation of 
the living conditions of the population, which on its turn will delegitimize the 
prestige of the State and the administration14. 
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English Elites, a delayed meritocracy 
If French elites were very critical of their German counterparts during the 19th 
century, French liberals were obsessed by what we may call the English politi-
cal model: the capacity of English traditional elites to avoid revolutions and 
maintain their power, prestige or privileges in spite of their contestation by the 
middle and the lower classes15. This success contrasted with the unability of 
French notables to do so. I have already proposed an explanation for this con-
trast insisting in particular on the importance of the landed capital, possessed 
by the gentry and the nobility in England, as compared to the more reduced 
rural wealth of notables in France16. In political systems founded on territorial 
constituencies, this secured a major advantage to the English ruling class before 
the extension of the franchise to the lower classes in 1884. But even after this 
reform the social composition of the House of Commons does not change very 
quickly as is shown by the professions of MPs of the two main parties on the 
eve of First World War. 
In absence of any indemnity for the MPs till 1911, the House of Commons 
is recruited in the upper strata of the British population. Upper middle class and 
aristocracy are the main pools of politicians : among liberal MPs in 1906, 18% 
are gentlemen, 6% commissioned officers, 21% important businessmen, 20% 
less important businessmen, 23% lawyers, 7% writers or journalists, 2% aca-
demics, 1% physicians, and only 2% trade-unionists17. Among the conserva-
tives, there are 31% of gentlemen, 20% of commissioned officers, 17% of 
important businessmen, 8% of middle range businessmen, 16% of lawyers, 4% 
of writers and journalists, 2% of academics and 1% of physicians. These class 
barriers are not only economic ones but also educational, as we see in the 
emergence of members of the professions taking the seats of the landed classes 
at the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless this growing importance of aca-
demic capital in the recruitment of political elites is much weaker than in 
France or even Germany at the same period. Whereas more than two thirds of 
MPs in France are University graduates or alumni of the «grandes écoles», the 
British data show that for Liberal MPs it is the case of only one third and for 
Conservatives around 20%18. This weakness of a meritocratic path is not lim-
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ited to the access of political elites. It is true too for other elites and a conse-
quence of the delayed modernization of English universities and secondary 
education and their social exclusivity. Before 1900, 77,5% of Conservative 
ministers, 44,4% of Liberal ministers, 71,1% of higher civil servants, 45,5% of 
board members of corporate firms, 50% of newspapers directors have been 
educated in the eleven main public schools19. 86% of scholarships for the two 
elite universities, Cambridge and Oxford, are in fact reserved for students com-
ing from these expensive public schools, while only 7% are offered to pupils 
from municipal grammar schools, socially more inclusive. Compared to the 
population of each sector, these percentages imply that grammar school pupils 
have 12 times less chance of winning a scholarship for Oxbridge than elite 
public school pupils who, in general, stem from more affluent families20. These 
brakes on meritocratic mechanisms are less visible in Scotland where universi-
ties are more open to popular or lower middle classes but, globally, the lack of 
public investment in education explains why social mobility or access to elites 
in England is linked to the private sector (journalism, business, trade, emigra-
tion to the colonies) and not, like in France and Germany, to education, public 
service or the professions. In 1911, students in England and Wales represent 
only 1% of their age-group, while in France they represent 1,7% and in Ger-
many 1,2%. In 1870, there were only 5000 students in Britain and more than 
the double in German and French faculties. This very small pool of graduates 
provides the administrative and political elites at the eve of the First World 
War. Therefore it is obvious that the preliminary social and economic selection 
is much more important than the intellectual one with so few candidates. 
This divergence from the continent is based also on different options in 
terms of taxation and repartition of expenses between State, local taxes and 
private initiative. As Martin Daunton has shown in a recent major book, Britain 
opted in the 1840s for direct and relatively moderate taxes to finance public 
expenses and reduced indirect taxes to guarantee cheap food to the popular 
classes and so lower the costs of production to favour its exports in a free trade 
prospect21. As a counterpart, the central State had to be modest with less civil 
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servants and military expenses than on the continent. Education and social 
expenses were financed either by families, or by charities or else by local rates 
defined by those of the middle classes or the lower middle class who were 
already electors. While France employed more than 400 000 civil servants at 
the end of 19th century for a less important population and territory than Brit-
ain, which employed only 116 000, or Prussia which employed 312 531 in 
1895.22. 
This liberal model is put into question at the turn of the century. British el-
ites are accused to be responsible for the decline of British economy as against 
Germany or United States and of the catastrophic state of health revealed by 
the selection of troops called for the Boer War23. Better organized workers 
allied with progressive liberals claim a greater public intervention in social 
policy and public health to correct the growing inequality since taxation is not 
progressive nor productive enough to face the new challenges and burdens of a 
modern society. The defenders of this new conception struggle also for meri-
tocracy and against the reproduction of traditional elites linked to inherited 
wealth. 
Conclusion 
This comparison of elite formation in France, Germany and Britain show that 
the interpretations founded whether on a modernist vision or on the idea of a 
persistent Ancien Regime both miss the specificities of each national case. The 
Third Republic in France is the most advanced in the installation of a new 
mode of domination based on merit and selective procedures (concours and so 
on). Notables have been obliged either to abandon their positions or to adapt to 
this new system. But important sectors of elite position are still based on inher-
ited economic capital. This is far more obvious in Germany and England, even 
if the evolution towards meritocratic procedures is emerging in these aristo-
cratic countries as well. The legal bourgeoisie who occupies a strategic position 
in the Third Republic is mainly responsible for the incomplete evolution to-
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wards true meritocracy; its leaders present in the governing circles refused to 
reform secondary education and limited the effects of university reform, in 
particular at the Law faculty, the most important for the access to power. They 
also refused the meritocratic selection for magistrates and the prefectoral corps 
in order to maintain social and political networks profiting directly to their own 
scions24. This double standard will be one of the defects of the Republic when 
various scandals will publicly show the difference between the official ideol-
ogy of merit diffused in the popular classes and the dubious practices of some 
members of the political and administrative elites in contradiction with this 
ideology. 
The same tensions will progressively appear in England and Germany be-
tween incomplete meritocracy and the growing aspirations of the larger groups 
a priori excluded from the sphere of recruitment of future elites25. So elite 
formation options as well as fiscal regimes and functions assigned to the State, 
themselves expressions of a social compromise between different fractions of 
elites and of the uneven aptitude of dominated groups to influence the field of 
power, are more important to investigate than to content oneself with the reduc-
tive analysis in global terms of “bourgeoisie” and “aristocracy”. 
References 
Best, Heinrich/Cotta, M. (eds) (2000): Parliamentary Representative in Europe 
1848-2000. Oxford: Oxford U.P.  
Charle, Christophe (2006): Les élites de la République (1880-1900). Paris: Fayard. 
First published 1987. 2nd enlarged and revised edition. 
Charle, Christophe (1988): “Noblesse et élites en France au début du XXe siècle”, 
actes du colloque de l’École française de Rome. In: Les Noblesses européennes 
aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Rome: Università di Milano/École française de Rome. 
pp. 407-433. 
Charle, Christophe (1990): Naissance des "intellectuels" (1880-1900). Paris: Édi-
tions de Minuit. 
Charle, Christophe (1993): “État et magistrats, les origines d’une crise prolongée”. 
In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 96-97. Mars 1993. pp. 39-48. 
Charle, Christophe (1994): “Le déclin de la République des avocats”. In: Birnbaum, 
P. (dir.): La France de l'affaire Dreyfus. Paris: Gallimard. pp. 56-86. 
Charle, Christophe (dir.) (1994): Les universités germaniques. Histoire de l'éduca-
tion. Mai 1994. 
Charle, Christophe (1997): “Légitimités en péril. Éléments pour une histoire des 
comparée des élites et de l’État en France et en Europe occidentale, XIXe-XXe 
                                                             
24  C. Charle, “État et magistrats, les origines d’une crise prolongée”, Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales, 96-97, mars 1993, p. 39-48; Guy Thuillier, L’ENA avant L’ENA, Paris, 
P.U.F., 1983. 
25  See C. Charle, La crise des sociétés impériales, op. cit.; H. Best & M. Cotta, Parliamentary 
Representative in Europe 1848-2000 , Oxford, Oxford, U.P., 2000. 
 260
siècles”. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 116-117. Mars 1997. 
pp. 39-52. 
Charle, Christophe (1997): “La bourgeoisie de robe en France au XIXe siècle”. In: 
Le Mouvement social, n°181. Octobre-Décembre 1997. pp. 52-72. 
Charle, Christophe (2001): La crise des sociétés impériales (1900-1940), essai 
d’histoire sociale comparée de l’Allemagne, de la France et de la Grande Breta-
gne. Paris: Le Seuil. 
Charle, Christophe (2003): “Les parlementaires de la troisième République, avant-
garde ou arrière-garde d’une société en mouvement?”. In: Chaline, J.-P./Corbin, 
A./Mayeur, J.-M. (eds): Les parlementaires de la troisième République. Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne. pp. 45-63. 
Charle, Christophe (2007): “French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model 
(1870-1914)”. In: Charle, C./Vincent, J./Winter, J. (eds): Anglo-French Attitudes: 
Comparisons and Transfers between French and British Intellectuals since the 
Eighteenth Century. Manchester: Manchester U.P. pp. 235-255. 
Chimènes, Myriam (2004): Mécènes et musiciens, du salon au concert à Paris sous 
la IIIè République. Paris: Fayard. 
Daunton, Martin (2001): Trusting Leviathan. The Politics of Taxation in Britain 
1799-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 
Delalande, Nicolas (2007): “Histoire économique et sociale du Léviathan britanni-
que: Etat société et impôt en Grande-Bretagne aux XIXe et XXe siècles”. In: Re-
vue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 54-1. Janvier-Mars 2007. pp. 258-264. 
Grandcoing, Philippe (1999): Les Demeures de la distinction. Châteaux et châte-
lains au XIXe siècle en Haute-Vienne. Limoges: PULIM. 
Grange, Cyril (1996): Les Gens du Bottin Mondain 1903-1987. Y être, c'est en être. 
Paris: Fayard. 
Guttsman, W. L. (1963): The British Political Elite. Londres: Mc Gibbon & Kee. 
Jarausch, Konrad H. (1982): Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany. 
The Rise of Academic Illiberalism. Princeton: Princeton U. P. 
Jarausch, Konrad H. (ed.) (1983): The Transformation of Higher Learning, Expan-
sion, Diversification, Social Opening and Professionalization in England, Ger-
many, Russia and the United States. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 
Karpik, Lucien (1995): Les Avocats. Entre l’État, le public, le marché XIIIe-XXe 
siècles. Paris, Gallimard. 
Kocka, Jürgen (ed.) (1988): Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im euro-
päischen Vergleich. München: DTV. 3 vol. 
Lowe, Roy (1985): “English elite education in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries”. In: Conze, W./Kocka, J. (eds.): Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahr-
hundert. Teil I. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. p. 147-162. 
Mac Clelland, Charles (1980): State, Society and University in Germany, 1700-
1914. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P. 
Mac Leod, Roy (ed.) (1988): Government and Expertise. Specialists, Administra-
tors and Professionals 1860-1919. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P. 
Mayer, Arno J. (1981): The persistence of Old Regime. Europe since 1848. New 
York. 
Ringer, Fritz K. (1992): Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Com-
parative Perspective, 1890-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P./Paris: Ed. de la 
MSH. 
 261
Searle, G. D. (1971): The Quest for National Efficiency. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Süle, Tibor (1988): Preussische Bürokratietradition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht. 
Thuillier, Guy (1983): L’ENA avant L’ENA. Paris: P.U.F. 
Thuillier, Guy/Tulard, Jean (1984): Histoire de l’administration française. Paris: 
PUF. 
Titze, Hartmut (1990): Der Akadamikerzyklus. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Rup-
recht. 
Vincent, Marie-Bénédicte (2006): Serviteurs de l’Etat: les élites administratives en 
Prusse de 1871 à 1933. Paris: Belin. 
